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THE SOCIAL AND THE EXTRA-SOCIAL.¹

§4. *Extra-social Conditions* (Sec. 313*a*).—While considering as we have the two intra-social or psychological forces, which we have now discussed as the only truly social forces, we should not overlook the very important group of influences which condition the sociological movement. These influences are really, so to speak, the banks or barriers which set limits to the social current, and even, by interaction with the strictly social forces, leave their marks within the social body. Their relation to the social forces properly so called is similar to that which the psychologists recognize between the strictly psychological and the physiological. The various states of the body, such as intoxication, fatigue, starvation, and over-nourishment, affect the mind, and so influence the individual's mental development; but we do not call them psychological forces. They are of psychological value only because, through the sorts of stimulation and limitation which they afford, they condition certain uniform results in the psychological organization itself. The analogy thus cited—between the extra-social influences with the effects they bring about in the social whole, and the extra-mental or physiological influences with their influence upon the individual's mental life—is indeed more than an analogy. When we reflect, we find that it is through the connection of mind and body—one term of the analogy—that the extra-social forces—the other term of the analogy—get their value. It becomes, therefore, still more apparent that we cannot call the influences enumerated below social forces; for so far are they from having direct value in the organization of society that they become factors in that organization only by the indirect road of stimulation to the nervous system of individuals. It would be just as appropriate to call blood-changes psychological facts as to call physical changes,

¹ The form of this brief article and its allusions are due to its consisting of certain new sections added by the writer in the new editions of his work *Social and Ethical Interpretations*.

such as the cutting of the Suez canal, social facts; yet both undoubtedly deserve recognition in a philosophical statement of all the determining conditions in these two branches of knowledge.

The sort of conditions which I mean by the phrase "extra-social" will appear from the enumeration below. It does not claim to be complete, however. Their full discussion does not come within our province, seeing that they are extra-psychological.

1. *Group-selection* (described above, Sec. 120).—In group-selection we have a condition of enormous importance in the development of social aggregations, especially in the instinctive and spontaneous periods; that is, of so-called "companies." It holds, however, for all societies when the conditions are such that groups as groups come into competition. Not only real war, but commercial and social wars of all kinds, illustrate group-selection. The working of the principle is strictly analogous, indeed identical, with that of natural selection in biology, an analogy excellently worked out by Bagehot in his remarkable work, *Physics and Politics*. It is one of the foundation stones also of S. Alexander's work, *Moral Order and Progress*. Bagehot acutely recognizes the distinction, without explicitly drawing it, between group-selection as a condition of evolution in the earlier stages of human aggregation and the operation of the real social force of "discussion" (described above under the heading "generalization") in the higher forms. It is, moreover, an additional proof that group-selection is a condition, and not a social force, that there is this difference between the lower and the higher; for the lower are determined, as we have seen, very largely by biological principles, such as instinct and physical heredity, and do not involve the social progress which the operation of the psychological forces brings in later on. Yet it is just there that group-selection is all-important.¹

¹ The corresponding truth has often been pointed out (see COPE, *Primary Factors of Evolution*, chap. 7; CATTELL, *Science*, N. S., Vol. III, p. 668; BALDWIN, *Psychological Review*, Vol. IV, 1897, p. 219) that natural selection in biological evolution is not a force or cause, but a condition. Spencer's phrase, "survival of the fittest," itself analyzes natural selection. The fitness is assumed; it is due to earlier

2. *Individual selection*, which is natural selection working upon individuals who are brought into competition with one another for life and death. For instance, let us suppose that a man of genius who has not yet given to the world his invention—his machine which, if produced by him, would have great influence upon the condition of the working classes—that this man meets a burglar in his library and is shot dead. Here is a case of natural selection which determines the course of social evolution in a nation or in the world by the elimination of an individual. Such a case shows that the natural selection of individuals is a condition of importance—when the individuals are important—in social development. But it is not a force even in biology, as we have just seen. It is a negative condition; a statement—in sociology as in biology—of evolution as it is, rather than as it would have been if the conditions had been other. This again is of especial importance in those stages of sociality in which the direct competition of individuals by physical strength or mental acuteness is in full operation.

3. *The intrusion of the "physiological cycle."*—In an earlier place (Sec. 43) we saw that the "cycle of causation" which psychological and sociological facts, such as beliefs, desires, etc., represent, often intrudes upon the operation of the "physiological cycle" by the personal selection of individuals in marriage. The physical heredity of the individuals is due to the mixed strains of the parents, and is in part, therefore, determined by their mutual choice of each other. The converse is also true: the physiological intrudes upon the sociological, and thus becomes an "extra-social condition" in its determination. This is seen in all cases in which physical heredity works results in individuals or groups which incapacitate them, especially endow them, or modify in any way their social fitness. A tall, manly race of men would have social advantages in winning wives from a higher group, and such marriages would tell at once inside their

real causes; the survival or selection which "natural selection" formulates is an *ex post facto* statement of results. It merely states that no further force of a positive sort is necessary (as against, *e. g.*, "special creation"). The distinction between "forces," which are *intrinsic*, and "conditions," which are *not intrinsic*, to the particular content, might well be traced through the sciences from biology to ethics.

own group. Where social preferment depended upon physical prowess, the inherited clubfoot would be an element of social unfitness. In the fact of what is called physical "presence," probably largely a matter of posture and vitality, we all recognize an easy substitute in many social positions for brains, culture, or oratorical gifts. Yet these things are not in themselves social; nor can they by any manipulation become social. The influence they have is entirely through the psychological states of which they are the conditions. A man with the illusion of a clubfoot would be as helpless as if it were real. And where is the hero so commonplace that his "presence" is not lordly to some love-sick maid?

4. Then there are the much-talked-of *physical conditions*, "the broken earth and the vaulted sky," the canal and the river-course, the mountain and the meadow. These, we are told, determine social development. They do; but by conditioning it, by intrusion upon it, by limiting it, not by being themselves social. That they are never. Let a race of animals that cannot think, nor recognize a social situation, nor know one another as reciprocating and fulfilling social give-and-take, run over the meadows and swim in the rivers, under a sky never so blue—and what effect of a social kind would these physical things have upon them? But given the psychological traits, make them men—and then what would not the human race do even on the levellest plain? Here again we have extra-social conditions. The land and water condition separation and segregation, competition and mutual defense, toleration and alliance, commerce and confederation; but the essentials of social matter and process must be there, and it is they that work under these conditions or those. Again, an illustration from recent biological theory, a case which often turns upon the effects of such physical differences as those mentioned: Isolation has been said to be a biological force, since, when animals are isolated from each other, the race is prevented from having the in-mixture of their hereditary strains, and so the heredity of the race is pre-limited. True, as a fact; but why make an abstraction do justice for a force? Isolation is always accomplished by some real force—

say a whirlwind which blows away the isolated individuals; but the biological forces are the life processes in those which are left. The whirlwind is the condition by which the result has been in a measure negatively determined; but who would say that the whirlwind is a biological force? At the most it is an intrusion of physics into the biological cycle. Just so with all the physical changes considered as influencing social life and development: they are conditions, intrusions from physics; not social forces.

The consideration of these extra-social conditions confirms us, therefore, in our view that only psychological sources of change¹ can be called "social forces," even in the figurative sense in which it is legitimate to use that word at all.² Other such conditions may be pointed out, but the examination of them will lead to the same conclusion.

(Sec. 169*a*.)—The question may very well be asked at this point how the various so-called "self-thoughts" hitherto distinguished are related to each other, and also how they are possible if the mind in all its development is proceeding with what has been called an identical content, in its thought of self. It is desirable, therefore, to make sure that we are not entangling ourselves in the meshes of our own details and distinctions. The matter straightens itself out when we recall to mind certain points already made out in what precedes.

First, we may recall the fact that a mental content may be considered either for itself or with regard to the attitudes, the

¹ And these of a particular sort. Inside of psychology the same distinction is to be made between "conditions" and "social forces." Not even all thoughts (as I have been represented as saying), but only certain thoughts (see *Soc. and Eth. Interpretations*, Secs. 325 f.), become social. Beliefs, desires, appetites, etc., are psychological *conditions* of the social.

² Figurative, since "force" is a physical conception. It means that which produces a change of rest or motion; and the sorts of forces are those producers of change which manifest themselves under different but constant physical conditions. We speak of mental, sociological, etc., forces in the analogous case of change in phenomena of one of these several orders; and to give the term any intelligible meaning we must keep within the particular order of phenomena as strictly as does the physicist in defining his forces always in terms of motion in space which determines other motion in space. In other words, the force is *intrinsic* or internal to the movement in which it is said to be manifested.

active processes, which accompany it. We have found, on the one hand, that the active processes are always functions of the content; and, on the other hand, that the content is always largely determined by earlier active processes. This is a genetic circle on which we have already remarked. It follows that the same content may be present in connection with different attitudes. When, for example, a self-content, at whatever stage of its development, is presented, having the additional marks which determine it to be another person, an alter, then the self-attitude aroused may be either what has been called "aggressive" or what has been called "accommodating," according as it, the attitude, is determining the content, or as the content is, in some degree, also determining the attitude. In the former case the alter is "ejective;" in the latter case it has elements which are "projective." What we mean, therefore, by the "self of habit or aggression," and the "self or accommodation or imitation," are not different self-contents. They have differences, to be sure, from the presence of an alter requiring one attitude or the other; but these are not elements of self, not self-marks, so to speak, until they have been taken over, by accommodation, from the projective and incorporated in the content of self. The differences of attitude are the differences of real genetic importance.

Second, the distinction between projective and ejective content turns upon the same requirement that we distinguish between content and attitude. When the self-content is accompanied by the aggressive attitude, the alter is never projective, never considered unfinished; it is then always ejective, thoroughly understood. The projective is always the aspect of persons which excites the accommodating imitative attitude. Once accommodated to, however, it becomes self-content, arouses habitual attitudes, and so goes on to be ejected.

Third, granted, then, that we have a developing self-content which at any time may be associated either with an aggressive or with an accommodating attitude, what shall we say of the "general" and of the "ideal" self? The general self, like the general everywhere in mental things, is, I believe, an attitude; an attitude which is a more or less complex integration of the

partial attitudes aroused in definite concrete cases. The self-content remains one, growing with experience, it is true, but never more than one self-content. The partial attitudes which habitually determine and express it tend to realize themselves severally; but it is the mark of the general that they are in some degree held in the larger issue which constitutes the limit of personal growth up to date. The general self is, therefore, the sense of a system of attitudes which avail, by reason of the relative adequacy of their ejective content, to cope with the varied personal experiences of life.

Fourth, this "general," like all mental attitudes considered with reference to their contents, is itself inadequate to personal situations not yet covered by experience. The attitude called the general is therefore itself different according as the content is determined "ejectively" or "projectively," *i. e.*, according as it determines the content, or the content in part determines it; according, that is, as the person met with, or the personal situation experienced, has new, interesting, instructive features, or, on the other hand, is thoroughly understood, and already successfully acted upon. The former is the "general" as above defined, and as properly designated — the attitude which is not violated in the round of concrete personal experiences; the latter is the "ideal" self. The ideal self, then, is the attitude which looks forward toward a statement of the self-content which is not yet secured, and which no concrete self-experience suffices to fulfill, but which would respond adequately, if we had it, to all possible personal demands. In its actual mechanism this means, I think — what it means also on the lower plane — the readiness or habit of our motor nature to accommodate itself ever more adequately, while at the same time it is becoming general and spontaneous in its expression. We may, indeed, recall here the outcome of the earlier chapter on the ethical self (Sec. 29) to the effect that in the ethical "ought" we have a "habit of violating habits;" a call to accommodate to what is as yet unrealized in actual self-content, and to modify the attitudes which accompany the actual content.

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